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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 This is the second time that this habeas corpus 
proceeding has been before us.  In the previous appeal, 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 20 F.3d 572  
(3d Cir. 1994), we reversed the district court's dismissal of 
Weatherwax's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanded 
for an evidentiary hearing on Weatherwax's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  After holding the evidentiary hearing, 
the district court granted Weatherwax's petition for habeas 
relief.  We will reverse. 
 
I. 
 William Weatherwax was indicted for the shooting death 
of St. Clair Hazel.  A jury acquitted him of first degree murder 
but convicted him of second degree murder and unlawful possession 
of a weapon.  We affirmed on direct appeal.  Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 893 F.2d 1329 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 Weatherwax thereafter filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, raising several arguments.  Only one of those 
arguments is relevant to this appeal.  Weatherwax alleged that 
during his trial a juror was observed with a newspaper containing 
an article about the trial.  The article allegedly reported an 
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inaccurate and unfavorable account of Weatherwax's testimony. 
Both Weatherwax and members of his family informed defense 
counsel of this fact but the lawyer failed to bring the matter to 
the trial court's attention.  Weatherwax claimed that his 
attorney's failure to bring this matter to the court's attention 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.   
 The district court rejected that argument, reasoning 
that the newspaper article was "a verbatim and dispassionate 
account of the testimony adduced at trial" which accordingly 
could not be prejudicial.  Weatherwax, 20 F.3d at 575.  We came 
to a different conclusion, however, finding that the actual trial 
testimony varied from the newspaper account in several 
significant respects.  We found that the difference between the 
article version and the official transcript, "[a]lthough subtle," 
could have been unfairly prejudicial because Weatherwax's 
testimony (but not the newspaper account) "argue[d] against 
second degree murder and support[ed] Weatherwax's self-defense 
testimony."  Id. at 577.0 
 We further found that "[i]f the jurors . . . read the 
damaging article with its distorted reporting of Weatherwax's 
testimony, the likelihood of resulting taint to the fairness of 
the trial [would be] apparent [and] Strickland's second prong 
would also be met."  20 F.3d at 580.  We, therefore, instructed 
that if the district court found on remand (1) that a juror in 
                     
0
  The article reported only on the testimony the jury had heard 
the preceding day; it included no extra-record information about 
Weatherwax or the crime. 
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fact had brought the newspaper into the jury room and (2) that 
Weatherwax's lawyer had been informed of this, then Weatherwax 
would have "made out a prima facie case of ineffective assistance 
of counsel under the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984),] standard."  Id.  If such a "prima facie" case were 
established on remand, we instructed that, "[t]he government must 
then be afforded the opportunity to question Weatherwax's counsel 
relative to his failure to request the voir dire in order to 
show, if applicable, that counsel proceeded on the basis of 
'sound trial strategy.'"  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689).  
 On remand, the government did not contest Weatherwax's 
claims (1) that a juror in fact had had possession of a newspaper 
in the jury room and (2) that Weatherwax's lawyer had been 
informed of this.  Thus, Weatherwax made out a prima facie case 
of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, and the 
burden shifted to the government to show that Weatherwax's 
counsel had proceeded on the basis of "sound trial strategy."   
Id.  
 To meet its burden, the government called Weatherwax's 
trial attorney, Michael Joseph.  In response, Weatherwax called 
his sister and his brother-in-law, who were present during the 
trial, and gave his own account of the relevant events.  With the 
sole exception noted below, the testimony of these witnesses was 
not in conflict. 
 Joseph, an experienced criminal defense lawyer and a 
lifelong resident of the Virgin Islands, was privately retained 
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by Weatherwax.  Weatherwax stayed with Joseph in his home during 
the last few days of pretrial preparation and throughout the 
trial.  Joseph considered it "a very difficult case."  (J.A. at 
23.)  Among other things, he explained to Weatherwax the strategy 
he intended to use in selecting a jury.  That strategy was based 
in part on the fact that Weatherwax's case had created a racially 
charged atmosphere in the Virgin Islands because Weatherwax was 
white, a so-called "Continental," and the victim was black.  It 
was also based on the facts surrounding the victim's death and 
Weatherwax's anticipated defense.  Joseph testified:   
      Q. [D]id you have a strategy, sir, with 
regard to selecting a jury? 
 
      A. Of course. 
 
      Q. And what was that strategy? 
       
      A.. . . I saw this case as a case in 
which the facts really were not too much in 
dispute as compared to the jury that would 
hear the facts and interpret the facts.  For 
instance, it would be undenied that an 
unlicensed firearm was involved.  It would be 
undenied that Mr. Weatherwax possessed an 
unlicensed firearm.  It would be undenied 
that Mr. Weatherwax discharged an unlicensed 
firearm. It would be undenied that the person 
who was shot did not have a firearm.  And it 
would be undenied that there would be 
witnesses who would have conflicting stories 
as to what danger he presented to Mr. 
Weatherwax. Therefore, I thought Mr. 
Weatherwax's perception as to what was 
happening to him, which is the gist of a self 
defense case, not what's really happening but 
whether the person reasonably perceived 
themselves to be in danger was the gist of 
this case and we needed jurors who would 
identify with that situation. 
 
* * * * 
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      Q.What were you striving to achieve in 
the composition of the Weatherwax jury? 
 
      A. Sympathy. 
 
      Q.And were you doing that based upon 
the profile of certain venire persons? 
 
      A. Absolutely. 
 
      Q.What were you looking for 
specifically? 
 
      A.I was looking for as many 
Continentals on the jury as possible. 
 
      Q.And for what reason did you do that? 
 
      A. Sympathy. 
 
      Q.Is that another way of saying you 
would assume that they identified with the 
defendant? 
 
      A. Absolutely. 
 
(J.A. at 23-24, 26-27.) 
 Joseph further testified that a second objective of his 
trial strategy was to persuade the jury to convict only on a 
lesser included offense in the event the evidence of self defense 
did not produce an acquittal on all counts. 
 The jury ultimately selected to hear Weatherwax's case 
consisted of three white and nine black jurors.  It was the 
largest number of Continentals Joseph had ever seen on a Virgin 
Islands jury and he was "ecstatic."  (J.A. at 28.)   
 On numerous occasions during the trial, the trial judge 
admonished the jury to avoid reading articles about the trial in 
the newspaper.  He did not, however, instruct them not to read a 
newspaper. 
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 On the morning of the last day of the trial, after 
Weatherwax had finished his testimony and just as the prosecution 
was about to call its rebuttal witnesses, Weatherwax's sister, 
Sally Lay, and his brother-in-law, William Lay, observed a juror 
walk from the jury room into the court room with a local 
newspaper under his arm.  They did not observe him reading the 
newspaper and, accordingly, did not know what portion of the 
paper the juror had been exposed to.  Mr. and Mrs. Lay advised 
Weatherwax and a bailiff of their observation.  The bailiff took 
no action but advised them to speak to their lawyer. 
 The Lays, Weatherwax, and several other members of his 
family took the bailiff's advice and informed Joseph about the 
newspaper as he was entering the door of the courtroom.  A 
conversation ensued.  Weatherwax expressed the view that it was 
"not right" for the juror to have a newspaper and he as well as 
his relatives asked Joseph to do something about it.  (J.A. at 
64.)  Mrs. Lay described the conversation and Joseph's response 
in the following terms: 
      Q.You didn't ask anything -- all I'm 
asking you, ma'am, is you didn't ask him to 
do anything specific.  You just asked him to 
do something about it? 
 
      A.We asked him to do something about 
it, file a motion or something and he said he 
would file a motion for a mistrial tomorrow. 
 
* * * * 
 
      Q.And that's not all he said, did he?  
He said something else didn't he? 
 
      A. In this conversation? 
 
      Q.Yes. 
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      A.Yes, he did. 
 
      Q.What did he say? 
 
      A.He said that he -- well, he said a 
lot of things during the course of the 
conversation. 
 
      Q.As specifically as you can recall, 
Mrs. Lay, I would like for you to tell the 
Court everything that Mr. Joseph said. 
 
      A.He said that the jury [sic] with the 
newspaper is a white man.  He would help 
Billy's case.  He was on our side.  Leave it 
alone.  He would file a motion for a mistrial 
tomorrow. 
 
      Q.So he told you essentially not to 
worry about it, didn't he? 
 
 Ms. Lamont:  Objection. 
 
The Court:  It's cross examination.  Ask her 
that question before you go on to something 
else. 
 
 By Mr. Humphreys: 
 
      Q.You may answer the question.  
Attorney Joseph told you not to worry about 
the situation, didn't he? 
 
      A.No, he did not use those words. 
 
      Q.But he did tell you, as a matter of 
fact, that he believed that the juror that 
you had identified was "on your side," didn't 
he? 
 
      A.Yes. 
 
      Q.And he also told you not to bring any 
attention to it, didn't he? 
 
      A.Yes. 
(J.A. at 67-68.)  Neither Weatherwax nor his family thereafter 
brought the newspaper to the attention of the court. 
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 Joseph testified that he had monitored the newspapers 
daily for inflammatory material and that he had read the article 
in that morning's paper before coming to court.  He described in 
the following terms his reaction upon being advised of the Lays' 
observation: 
      A.. . . So telling me a juror has a 
newspaper and walk [sic] into court tells me 
-- my impression was that's a pretty honest 
man. 
 
      Q.Why was he an honest man? 
 
      A.Because if he wanted assistance from 
the newspaper as to what is happening in 
court, he would have read it clandestinely.  
He wouldn't have just walked to court like 
that. Many people in this community love the 
sports page.  Many people love to do 
crossword puzzles.  If they don't do their 
crossword puzzle, they don't have a good day. 
 
      Q.Do you believe that the possession of 
a newspaper, the possession, in and of 
itself, was a valid basis for a mistrial? 
 
      A.Absolutely not. 
 
      Q.Was it a valid basis for polling the 
jury? 
 
      A.Not that jury. 
 
      Q.Because you wanted that jury? 
 
      A.Absolutely.  On another jury I might 
have used it as an excuse. 
 
      Q.So you did not request that the jury 
be polled? 
 
      A.No. 
 
      Q.Was that a strategic decision on your 
part, sir?   
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      A.Of course it was.  That's what I'm 
trying to tell you, sir, that if anybody, 
including Judge Almeric Christian, had come 
and tell [sic] me, "Michael Joseph, it is my 
opinion that you should poll the jury," I 
would have said, "Your Honor, leave my jury 
alone." 
 
(J.A. at 37-38.) 
 The sole conflict in the testimony relates to whether 
Joseph committed himself during this conversation to the filing 
of a motion for a mistrial.  Mrs. Lay insisted that he did: 
      Q.  To your knowledge, what was done? 
 
      A.Mr. Joseph said that he would take 
care of it and he would file a motion for a 
mistrial tomorrow. 
 
(J.A. at 48.) 
 Joseph testified that he said he would think about the 
matter but insisted that he did not commit to seeking a mistrial. 
      Q.Do you recall ever telling anyone 
that you might consider a motion for a 
mistrial? 
 
      A.Not only do I not recall not telling 
anyone that.  I would call any lawyer that 
would have moved for a mistrial on those 
grounds a fool because of the composition of 
the jury. It was a rare jury.  Probably the 
odds of such a jury being selected again was 
nil. And if someone mentioned that to me, I 
probably would have laughed at them. 
 
 I recall telling Billy that it was my 
opinion that this is the best shot he's 
getting right here, Mr. Weatherwax, that this 
jury was about the best jury he would ever 
get. 
 
     Q.Well, let's get inside your thought 
process. You told the defendant that you 
would think about it.  Did you, in fact, 
think about it? 
 
     A.Of course. 
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     Q.Did you come to a conclusion about 
whether or not it would be important for you 
to either request a mistrial or request a 
polling of the jury? 
 
     A.Again, it's important that you 
understand that this had been a jury that 
left me very happy, with a very happy 
feeling.  
 
(J.A. at 33-34.)   
 No motion for a mistrial was filed by Joseph and the 
newspaper incident was not pursued prior to the filing of this 
habeas proceeding.     
 The district court credited Joseph's testimony that he 
made a deliberate and strategic decision not to pursue the 
newspaper issue.  It concluded, however, that during his 
conversation with the Weatherwax family he had led them to 
believe that the issue would be pursued in some way. 
Specifically, the district court found that "[d]espite giving 
some assurances that he would 'file a motion,' Attorney Joseph 
determined that the incident did not warrant interfering with the 
composition of the jury."  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 7.) 
 Despite its conclusion that Joseph's decision had been 
deliberate and strategic, the district court nevertheless ruled 
that Joseph's failure to call the court's attention to the 
incident of alleged juror misconduct was unreasonable under the 
Strickland standard for measuring an attorney's performance.  It 
explained: 
[C]ounsel's decision not to notify the court 
of the juror's misconduct, was in the first 
instance a breach of a fundamental duty to 
his client, and in the second, a breach of 
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his duty as an officer of this court. 
Accepting trial counsel's claim as to a 
strategy, this court finds that the decision 
denied the trial judge, and therefore counsel 
and client, the opportunity to conduct the 
searching inquiry that was required to 
determine the extent of the jury's exposure 
to the extra-judicial evidence.  As such, the 
decision cannot be said to have been 
reasonable exercise of professional judgment. 
 
(Dist. Ct. Op. at 16.) 
 The court then addressed the second prong of the 
Strickland test and determined that the facts warranted relief 
under the doctrine of that case.  It found that "because of trial 
counsel's disregard of his client's wishes and his duty to this 
court, there are no objective criteria upon which this court can 
determine prejudice, if any, as a result of the juror's 
misconduct.  To the extent that a voir dire was not conducted, 
proof of prejudice is excused.  Since finality concerns are 
weaker when one of the assurances that the result of the 
proceeding is reliable is absent, a new trial is warranted." 
(Dist. Ct. Op. at 17-18.) 
 
II. 
 We review the district court's findings of fact for 
clear error.  We must make an independent judgment, however, on 
whether the facts thus found constitute constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 
F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 645 (1993). 
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III. 
 The district court reasoned that Joseph breached a duty 
to his client because he (a) failed to take steps necessary to 
secure a voir dire inquiry directed to the issue of whether the 
newspaper in fact had prejudiced the jury and (b) failed to 
consult with or follow directions from his client about strategic 
matters.  Our de novo review leads us to a contrary conclusion. 
 
A. 
 We start with the teachings of Strickland v. 
Washington: 
In any case presenting an ineffectiveness 
claim, the performance inquiry must be 
whether counsel's assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances. Prevailing 
norms of practice as reflected in American 
Bar Association standards and the like, e.g., 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 
4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) ("The Defense Function"), 
are guides to determining what is reasonable, 
but they are only guides. No particular set 
of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can 
satisfactorily take account of the variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the 
range of legitimate decisions regarding how 
best to represent a criminal defendant.  Any 
such set of rules would interfere with the 
constitutionally protected independence of 
counsel and restrict the wide latitude 
counsel must have in making tactical 
decisions.  See United States v. Decoster, 
199 U.S. App. D.C., at 371, 624 F.2d, at 208.  
Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines 
for representation could distract counsel 
from the overriding mission of vigorous 
advocacy of the defendant's cause. 
 
* * * * 
 
 Judicial scrutiny of counsel's 
performance must be highly deferential.       
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. . .  A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances 
of counsel's challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel's 
perspective at the time.  Because of the 
difficulties inherent in making the 
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged 
action "might be considered sound trial 
strategy." 
 
466 U.S. at 688-89 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 
(1955)). 
 Thus, while professional standards provide guidance in 
evaluating the performance of counsel, they do not define the 
boundary between constitutionally acceptable and constitutionally 
unacceptable performance.0  The Constitution requires only that 
counsel's assistance be "reasonable" considering all of the 
circumstances and the ultimate objective of assuring "vigorous 
                     
0
  The Supreme Court elaborated on this point in Nix v. 
Whiteside, stating that: 
 
[B]reach of an ethical standard does not 
necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel. 
When examining attorney conduct, a court must 
be careful not to narrow the wide range of 
conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment 
so restrictively as to constitutionalize 
particular standards of professional conduct 
and thereby intrude into the state's proper 
authority to define and apply the standards 
of professional conduct applicable to those 
it admits to practice in its courts. 
 
475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986). 
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advocacy of the defendant's cause."  Id. at 689.  Moreover, the 
evaluation of reasonableness must begin with a "strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance."  Id.  
 Applying these principles in Strickland, the Supreme 
Court discussed the interplay between an attorney's duty to 
investigate a matter and her strategic choices regarding that 
matter: 
[S]trategic choices made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable; and strategic choices made 
after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that 
reasonable professional judgments support the 
limitations on investigation.  In other 
words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary.  In any ineffectiveness case, a 
particular decision not to investigate must 
be directly assessed for reasonableness in 
all the circumstances, applying a heavy 
measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 
 
Id. at 690-91. 
 In a sense, Joseph made his strategic choice not to 
move for a mistrial "after less than complete investigation";  he 
decided that it would be better to keep the jury intact without 
first inquiring into whether the jurors read or were influenced 
by the newspaper article.  Still, Joseph's decision not to 
investigate the possibility of juror prejudice was itself a 
strategic decision.  Unlike the usual case where a lawyer fails 
to fully investigate a matter, Joseph could not conduct an 
investigation without first bringing the newspaper incident to 
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the court's attention.  Once he brought the matter to the court's 
attention, however, he would relinquish to the court at least 
some control over whether this particular jury would decide his 
client's fate. 
 Given the limited information that Joseph had in front 
of him -- that a juror had been seen with a newspaper, and that 
the newspaper contained a potentially damaging article -- and 
given Joseph's view that this jury was the best that could be 
expected from Weatherwax's point of view, we think that the 
decision not to inform the court was reasonable "under prevailing 
professional norms."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  Joseph acted 
in what he believed to be his client's best interests.  He 
believed that he had the best jury possible under the 
circumstances, and he made a judgment that many competent 
litigators would make under the same circumstances.  Bringing the 
newspaper incident to the court's attention would have created a 
possibility that the court would either declare a mistrial or 
otherwise alter a jury which Joseph felt favored the defense.0 
Given the Supreme Court's statement that "[t]here are countless 
                     
0
  We do not agree with the dissent that Joseph could have 
satisfied his client's request without substantial risk of losing 
what he believed to be a favorable jury.  "In every case where 
the trial court learns that a member or members of the jury may 
have received extra-record information with a potential for 
substantial prejudice, the trial court must determine whether the 
members of the jury have been prejudiced."  Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1987). 
Thus, had Joseph brought the newspaper incident to the trial 
court's attention, the court would have had an affirmative 
obligation to conduct voir dire and would have had discretion, if 
it found exposure to the article, to excuse one or more jurors or 
to declare a mistrial. 
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ways to provide effective assistance in any given case," and the 
"strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance," id. at 689, we 
cannot, without more, rule that Joseph's decision not to 
investigate further was unreasonable as a matter of strategy.0 
                     
0
  Unlike our dissenting colleague, we do not view as inherently 
unreasonable Joseph's judgment that it was in Weatherwax's 
interest to have a jury including three white jurors rather than 
one having fewer or no white jurors.  Lawyers necessarily make 
trial strategy judgments based on probabilities.  While they 
occasionally have hard empirical data to rely upon, the 
probabilities they utilize are more frequently based on an 
assessment of human nature rooted in the lawyer's own personal 
experience.  Weatherwax had testified that the victim started 
coming at him with a rock and that he feared for his life. Joseph 
believed that, as a matter of probability, jurors of Weatherwax's 
own racial background would be more likely to identify with 
Weatherwax and believe his fear to be genuine than would jurors 
of the victim/assailant's racial background.  There is no way to 
determine whether Joseph's belief is empirically accurate.  It 
has not been shown to be empirically inaccurate, however, and we 
are unwilling to say that it is a view that a reasonable attorney 
could not hold. 
 
     The Supreme Court has held that neither the prosecution nor 
the defense may, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, 
utilize state-created peremptory challenges to exclude jurors 
from service on a jury because of their race.  Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 
U.S. 42, 59 (1992).  The Supreme Court has never concluded, 
however, that aversions and affinities arising from the attitudes 
and experiences of different racial groups do not exist or that 
they do not affect jury verdicts.  There is some empirical 
evidence to the contrary.  E.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
287 (1987) (discussing a study indicating that black defendants 
who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving 
the death penalty); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal 
Protection, and Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 
1994 Wis. L. Rev. 511, 628 n.584 (noting that studies have found 
that the likelihood of a decision to acquit is correlated to the 
race of the juror and of the defendant); id. at 619, 630 (arguing 
that, because of the way racism operates in the courtroom, a 
minority defendant ought to be able to use race-based peremptory 
challenges to increase minority participation on the jury); Nancy 
J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring 
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B. 
 The district court also found that Joseph's 
representation was ineffective because he failed to follow 
direction from or fully consult with his client when he decided 
not to bring the newspaper incident to the court's attention. 
 There is general agreement in the case law and the 
rules of professional responsibility that the authority to make 
decisions regarding the conduct of the defense in a criminal case 
is split between criminal defendants and their attorneys.  See 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); United States v. 
Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
127 (1992); 1 American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice § 4-5.2 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter ABA 
Standards].  While this general proposition is more clear than 
precisely where to draw the dividing line, the Supreme Court has 
provided some guidance that helps to narrow the issue.   
                                                                  
the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 63, 
80-99 (1993) (reviewing studies reporting that juror race 
influences jury decisions); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence 
and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1611, 1616-43 (1985) 
(discussing research reporting influence of juror racial bias on 
the determination of guilt); see also McCollum, 505 U.S. at 61 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (recognizing the broad perception, 
confirmed by "[c]ommon experience and common sense," that 
"conscious and unconscious prejudice persists in our society and 
that it may influence some juries"); id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting) ("It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious 
racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority 
defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps 
determining the verdict of guilt or innocence.").  Nor has the 
Supreme Court ever held that ineffective assistance of counsel 
occurs whenever an attorney exercises his or her professional 
judgment based on the belief that such aversions and affinities 
may influence a jury's verdict.  We do not believe it would so 
hold if presented with this case. 
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 In Jones, the Supreme Court held that although a 
criminal defendant has an equal access right to an appeal under 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, he has no 
constitutional right to insist that appellate counsel advance 
every non-frivolous argument the defendant wants raised.  463 
U.S. at 754.  The Court's review of its prior jurisprudence in 
Jones reflected a recognition that "the accused has the ultimate 
authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the 
case."  Id. at 751.  As examples of those "fundamental 
decisions," the Court pointed to the decisions concerning whether 
to plead guilty, to waive the right to trial by jury, to testify 
in one's own behalf, to take an appeal, or to waive the right to 
counsel.  See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 
(1975).   
 In support of its analysis, the Jones Court referred to 
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a), which reserves 
decisions on fundamental matters to the client, and then 
expressly recognized the complementary proposition that non-
fundamental decisions are to be made by counsel on the basis of 
his or her professional judgment exercised after consultation 
with the client: 
"A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation   
. . . and shall consult with the client as to 
the means by which they are to be pursued.    
. . .  In a criminal case, the lawyer shall 
abide by the client's decision, . . . as to a 
plea to be entered, whether to waive jury 
trial and whether the client will testify." 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Proposed 
Rule 1.2(a) (Final Draft 1982) (emphasis 
added). 
21 
 
With the exception of these specified 
fundamental decisions, an attorney's duty is 
to take professional responsibility for the 
conduct of the case, after consulting with 
his client. 
 
463 U.S. at 753 n.6. 
 
 The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice recognize as 
being among the non-fundamental issues reserved for counsel's 
judgment "whether and how to conduct cross-examinations, what 
jurors to accept or strike, [and] what trial motions should be 
made . . . ."  ABA Standards § 4-5.2(b).  Several courts have 
also recognized witness selection as being among the non-
fundamental decisions that counsel is entitled to make at trial. 
E.g., United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 855 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that counsel's failure to call alibi witnesses was not 
ineffective assistance and stating:  "This Court will not second-
guess tactical decisions of counsel in deciding whether to call 
certain witnesses."); State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86, 92 (Conn. 
1986) (holding that counsel's refusal to call a witness that his 
client had instructed him to call did not violate defendant's 
right to compulsory process); People v. Deere, 710 P.2d 925, 931 
(Cal. 1985) (in bank); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 
(1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[The attorney], not the 
client, has the immediate -- and ultimate -- responsibility of 
deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, 
and what defenses to develop.").  The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has concluded that issue selection similarly falls in 
this category.  Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 328 (6th Cir. 
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1984) (criminal defense counsel may make strategic decision to 
assert self-defense rather than battered wife syndrome as defense 
at client's murder trial).  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
has concluded that counsel has the ultimate authority to decide 
issues concerning "what evidence should be introduced, what 
stipulations should be made, what objections should be raised, 
and what pre-trial motions should be filed."  Teague, 953 F.2d at 
1531.   
 Recent decisions of the First and Eleventh Circuit 
Courts of Appeals recognize the prerogatives of defense counsel 
with respect to non-fundamental matters in the course of 
rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  In Routly v. 
Singletary, 33 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 2627 (1995), the petitioner in a habeas proceeding maintained 
that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel 
during his homicide trial.  The jury had returned to the 
courtroom during its deliberations and informed the court that it 
had been unable to hear the testimony of the state's primary 
witness.  Petitioner faulted counsel for not moving for a 
mistrial on the ground that the jury was thus deliberating 
without the benefit of an important segment of the trial 
evidence.  The district court rejected the ineffective assistance 
claim based on the fact that counsel's decision not to move for a 
mistrial was a "deliberate tactical choice."  33 F.3d at 1289. 
Counsel decided "not to move for a mistrial precisely because the 
jury might have difficulty in coming to unanimous agreement 
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concerning the content of the state's most important witness." 
Id.  The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 1282.  
 In United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223 (1st Cir. 
1993), the defendant corrections officer was alleged to have shot 
and killed an inmate while acting out a "Russian roulette" scene 
from the motion picture The Deerhunter (Universal Studios 1978). 
The prosection wished to introduce a fifteen minute excerpt from 
the film containing the scene allegedly mimicked.  Defense 
counsel, over the strenuous objection of his client, stipulated 
that the film could be exhibited to the jury in its entirety. The 
court held that this was not ineffective assistance of his 
client, observing: 
Based on his judgments concerning relevance, 
probative value, unfairly prejudicial impact, 
and how the judge would likely rule, counsel 
calculated that he would not prevail on a 
motion to exclude the film clip.  In an 
effort to cut anticipated losses, he obtained 
a stipulation from the prosecution that the 
entire three-hour movie would be shown, in 
the expectation that the impact of the 
critical scene would be dissipated. 
 
* * * *  
 
To avoid the shoals of ineffective 
assistance, an attorney's judgment need not 
necessarily be right, so long as it is 
reasonable.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-
91, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.  Here, counsel made an 
unarguably reasonable choice.  In acting on 
it, he extracted a fair concession for the 
ensuing stipulation, compelling the 
prosecution to show the entire film rather 
than zeroing in on the shorter, more powerful 
excerpt.  And, finally, counsel's decision 
not to abide by the wishes of his client has 
no necessary bearing on the question of 
professional competence; indeed, in some 
instances, listening to the client rather 
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than to the dictates of professional judgment 
may itself constitute incompetence. 
 
11 F.3d at 227 (footnote omitted). 
 
 The district court in this proceeding concluded that 
Joseph was required to follow Weatherwax's direct instruction to 
"do something," such as "file a motion."  We disagree.  Whether 
to file a motion in this context was not a "fundamental 
decision[] regarding the case."  Jones, 463 U.S. at 751. Wherever 
the precise line between client and counsel decision-making 
should be drawn, this decision fell squarely within the realm of 
strategy and tactics and thus was a decision for Joseph to make. 
 Some of the decisions deemed "fundamental" -- such as a 
decision whether to plead guilty or to take an appeal -- relate 
directly to the objectives of the representation.  Cf. Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1994) (stating that a 
lawyer must abide by a client's decisions concerning the 
objectives of representation).  While the accused should receive 
the full and careful advice of her lawyer before entering a 
guilty plea or taking an appeal, these decisions ultimately must 
be made by the defendant herself.  The lawyer can inform the 
client of the likely consequences of those decisions, but only 
the defendant knows whether she prefers to bear those 
consequences or prefers to accept the costs and consequences of 
going to trial or filing an appeal. 
 Other fundamental decisions, such as whether to forego 
assistance of counsel, to waive a jury trial, or to testify in 
one's own behalf, in a sense may be viewed as strategic decisions 
25 
because they relate to the means employed by the defense to 
obtain the primary object of the representation -- ordinarily, a 
favorable end result.  Nevertheless, these decisions are so 
personal and crucial to the accused's fate that they take on an 
importance equivalent to that of deciding the objectives of the 
representation.  As the Court explained in Faretta, for example, 
"although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own 
detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for 
the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.'"  422 U.S. at 
834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 Joseph's decision not to bring the newspaper incident 
to the court's attention cannot be regarded as fundamental. 
First, Joseph's decision did not relate directly to the 
objectives of his representation at that point -- acquittal of 
first degree murder and the lesser charges.  Instead, Joseph's 
decision concerned only the means employed by the defense to 
reach that agreed-upon goal.  As the commentary to Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.2(a) states, while a lawyer must abide by 
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of her 
representation, a lawyer "is not required to . . . employ means 
simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do so."   
 Nor did Joseph usurp Weatherwax's authority to make a 
fundamental personal decision comparable to decisions on whether 
to forego assistance of counsel, to waive a jury trial, or to 
testify in one's own behalf.  Instead, Joseph's decision 
concerned whether he should object once he learned that a 
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distorted newspaper account of the trial testimony may have made 
its way to the jury.  It was clearly an important decision, but 
it was not one where respect for the individual's autonomy 
requires us to disregard the desirability of having professional 
judgment exercised in the client's best interest. 
 We believe Joseph's decision not to object was 
analogous to a strategic choice not to object to the admission of 
inadmissible hearsay evidence tendered by the prosecution.  In 
both situations, the consequence of a failure to object is that 
the jury will (or in Weatherwax's case might) learn information 
untested by the adversarial process that it would not otherwise 
have learned.  In both instances, defense counsel has the power 
to prevent that from happening, but decides that it is 
strategically advantageous not to make the objection.  Contrary 
to the district court's suggestion, in neither instance is the 
defendant's right to a jury trial implicated.  In both instances 
the decision is "the exclusive province of the lawyer," ABA 
Standards § 4-5.2(b), and if, as here, that decision has a 
rational basis, a court is without authority to second-guess 
counsel's judgment call.  
 
C. 
 That Joseph's decision was not a fundamental one and 
thus fell into "the exclusive province of the lawyer" does not 
end our inquiry, however.  Important strategic and tactical 
decisions should be made only after a lawyer consults with his 
client.  ABA Standards § 4-5.2(b); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 
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(noting counsel's "duties to consult with the defendant on 
important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of 
important developments in the course of the prosecution").   
 The interchange between Joseph and his client in the 
courthouse on the last morning of the trial cannot fairly, in our 
judgment, be described as a failure to consult.  Considering the 
fact that the newspaper incident arose suddenly when counsel was 
entering the courtroom on the last morning of the trial, this 
interchange, while brief, was far from perfunctory.  Mrs. Lay 
indicated that it lasted long enough for each of the family 
members to speak and for Joseph to say "a lot of things during 
the course of the conversation."  (J.A. 67.)  Joseph listened to 
what the client's family had to report and to their views about 
what should be done.  He evaluated that information and expressed 
his own view of what was in Weatherwax's best interests. 
Moreover, he explained the reasons behind his view -- that this 
was the best jury Weatherwax could hope for.  Neither Weatherwax 
nor his family complained at the hearing about Joseph not 
listening or cutting them off short.  Their complaint was that 
they wanted him to "file a motion" and he did not file one. While 
this is true, it does not mean that Joseph failed to consult with 
his client about the decision to be made. 
 The requirement that counsel consult with his or her 
client concerning issues on which counsel has the final word 
serves a number of important purposes.  First, it assures that 
the client will have the opportunity to assist with his own 
defense.  As one court has noted, "[w]hile an attorney's 
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education and experience give him superior knowledge of 
generalized technical information, '[t]he client possesses 
superior knowledge of another sort -- knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances of his case.'"  Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 
1146 n.33 (11th Cir.) (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed 
Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 41, 100 
(1979)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991); cf. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 691 (noting that counsel's decision not to investigate a 
matter must be evaluated in light of information that the 
defendant might have supplied the lawyer).  Second, the client's 
views and desires concerning the best course to be followed are 
relevant considerations that must be evaluated and taken into 
account by counsel.  Without consultation, the views and desires 
of the client may not be known to counsel.  Third, consultation 
serves to promote and maintain a cooperative client-counsel 
relationship.  We have carefully reviewed the record in this case 
and we perceive no threat to the accomplishment of any of these 
objectives.  Weatherwax had an ample opportunity to convey the 
information available to him and to share his own appraisal of 
the situation, and nothing about the length or character of the 
conference would appear to have strained the attorney-client 
relationship between Joseph and Weatherwax. 
 Consultation between counsel and client may in some 
circumstances serve a fourth purpose.  If the client learns from 
a consultation that counsel is going to pursue a strategy 
contrary to the client's wish and the matter is important enough 
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to the client to forego the benefits of his current 
representation, the consultation may afford the client an 
opportunity to seek different representation.  Given that Joseph 
was found to have given some assurance that he would "file a 
motion" and not to have communicated his final decision to 
Weatherwax, this fourth purpose requires further discussion. 
 The constitutional duty to consult regarding issues on 
which counsel has the last word requires only that counsel act 
reasonably in light of the circumstances and what is likely to be 
accomplished by a consultation.  When decisions must be made in 
the heat of battle at trial, for example, it will often be 
unreasonable to expect any consultation before the decision is 
made and implemented, either because the opportunity for 
meaningful consultation does not exist or because there is little 
if anything to be gained by consultation. 
 Even where there is an opportunity for consultation, 
counsel may reasonably elect not to communicate his final 
decision when counsel and client have previously exchanged their 
views on the issue and the alternative of changing representation 
is not a realistic one.  In many trial situations, the nature or 
importance of the issue over which a client-counsel disagreement 
occurs cannot be expected to cause the client seriously to 
consider foregoing the advantages of the current representation. 
In other situations, consideration of a change in representation 
would be pointless because the court would not permit it at that 
stage in the proceedings. 
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 Here, Weatherwax did not contend, and the district 
court did not find, that Weatherwax would have sought to change 
representation had he been advised of Joseph's final decision on 
the newspaper issue.  Nor did Weatherwax contend, or the district 
court find, that Joseph should have anticipated that the district 
court might permit a continuance and change of representation on 
the last day of Weatherwax's jury trial.  Indeed, Weatherwax did 
not argue, and the district court did not find, that there was an 
opportunity for meaningful consultation with Weatherwax after 
Joseph made his decision not to pursue the newspaper issue. 
 We cannot say on the basis of this record that Joseph 
acted unreasonably under all the circumstances in failing to tell 
Weatherwax, prior to the jury's verdict,0 of his ultimate 
decision on the newspaper issue.0  Joseph had rebuttal witnesses 
                     
0
  Nothing, of course, foreclosed Weatherwax from pursuing the 
newspaper issue after the verdict, by himself or through other 
counsel, as he ultimately did in this proceeding. 
0
  The district court did not find that Joseph made his final 
decision on the newspaper issue during the courtroom conference 
and thus that Joseph was deliberately misleading his client when 
he said he would "do something."  Accordingly, we decline to 
assume that this was the case.  If such deception had occurred, 
however, there would appear to be no causal nexus between that 
deception and the alleged problem here -- the resolution of 
Weatherwax's case by a jury that may have been exposed to a 
distorted newspaper account of the trial testimony.  Whether 
Joseph made his final decision before or after the conclusion of 
the conference, the district court was not at liberty to overturn 
Weatherwax's conviction without making a finding, based on record 
evidence, that without Joseph's assurances about filing a motion, 
an objection would have been raised and the course of events 
altered.  This is not to say that Weatherwax had the burden of 
showing that the newspaper article adversely affected the jury. 
We do say, however, that habeas corpus relief on the basis of 
Joseph's assurances would have been inappropriate where there was 
no reason to believe a different jury would have decided 
Weatherwax's case in the absence of those assurances. 
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to cross-examine, a jury instruction conference to attend, and a 
summation to deliver.  Even assuming there was a fair opportunity 
to consult further with Weatherwax, however, we do not believe 
Joseph could reasonably be expected to have anticipated that 
anything would be accomplished by taking that course.  On the 
contrary, given the circumstances disclosed in the record, we 
believe that reasonable counsel in Joseph's position would not 
have believed either that Weatherwax would seriously consider a 
change in representation or that, if he did, the court would have 
permitted a change in representation at that stage of the 
proceedings.  Not only would an extended continuance have been a 
burden on the jury, the trial court would have no assurance that 
new counsel would not insist on the same strategy upon which 
Joseph was insisting.   
 In short, after discussing the pros and cons of a 
tactical decision with his client, Joseph made a reasonable 
choice that was his to make.  His failure to advise his client of 
that decision cannot be said to be unreasonable, and Weatherwax 
has thus failed to carry his burden of overcoming the presumption 
of constitutionally acceptable performance. 
 
IV. 
 The district court also reasoned that Joseph's decision 
not to bring the newspaper incident to the court's attention was 
a "breach of his duty as an officer of the court."  (Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 16.)  Joseph's duty to the trial court, in the district 
court's view, followed both from counsel's "duty to bring to bear 
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such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable 
adversarial testing process," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, and 
from the trial judge's repeated admonitions that the jury should 
avoid reading articles about the trial.   
 We express no opinion on whether Strickland or the 
trial court's repeated admonitions support the district court's 
theory that Joseph's duty as an officer of the court required him 
to bring the matter to the court's attention.0  As we have 
explained, Joseph acted as he did solely for the purpose of 
serving what he believed to be the best interests of his client 
and in a manner consistent with his other obligations to his 
client.  Given this fact, even if Joseph had some duty to the 
court to inform it of the possibility of jury misconduct, we 
perceive no reason why the breach of that duty should require the 
reversal of Weatherwax's conviction.  If counsel breaches a duty 
to the court, this does not necessarily mean that the 
representation of his client was ineffective.  Assuming that 
Joseph did violate some ethical duty to the court that would 
warrant disciplinary sanctions against him, that breach would 
provide no justification for a remedy that would, in effect, 
impose a sanction upon the government.  Indeed, we believe that 
                     
0
  The Weatherwax family did not report to Joseph a violation of 
the court's order that jurors refrain from reading articles about 
the case.  Joseph's view that there likely had been no violation 
of that order was not unreasonable.  Moreover, the investigation 
necessary to determine whether there had been a violation could 
not be conducted without court approval and seeking such approval 
was, in Joseph's professional judgment, inconsistent with his 
duty of loyalty to his client.  The issue of whether Joseph had 
an ethical duty to the court to report the newspaper incident is, 
accordingly, a debatable one. 
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overturning a conviction in a situation of this kind on the basis 
of counsel's breach of an ethical duty to the court would create 
a perverse incentive for defense counsel to "build in" reversible 
error for their clients by violating their duties as officers of 
the court. 
 We accordingly hold that any breach of Joseph's duty to 
the court would not support the judgment of the district court. 
 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's 
judgment directing Weatherwax's retrial or release will be 
reversed and this case will be remanded with instructions that 
his petition for habeas relief be denied. 
 
 
                                    
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. William Weatherwax 
No. 95-7126 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 A naive assumption about race served as the sole basis for Joseph's "strategic 
decision" to ignore the wishes of his client regarding the newspaper incident.  I not only 
believe that the decision was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; I also 
believe that it was based upon an underlying assumption that was explicitly rejected as 
unreasonable by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (rejecting the 
notion that it is reasonable to assume that black jurors will be partial to black 
defendants solely on account of their shared race).  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.  
Accordingly, I dissent.0 
 Although the majority acknowledges the "racially charged" nature of this case, I 
do not believe it adequately pursues the extent to which race influenced Joseph's decision 
not to inform the court about the juror seen carrying a newspaper into the jury room, 
which included an inaccurate and unfavorable article about his client's testimony.  In my 
view, in order to assess fairly whether Joseph's strategic choice was reasonable, we must 
candidly address the assumptions that influenced his decision. 
I. 
                     
0
 This case does not require us to decide the broader and admittedly more difficult 
question of the reasonableness or legitimacy of trial strategies that are designed to 
appeal to the particular racial make-up of a jury.  Rather, the views I express relate 
specifically to the issue of whether a strategic decision, grounded exclusively upon a 
lawyer's assumptions about the proclivities of jurors based solely upon their race, can be 
considered professionally reasonable when that decision runs counter to the express wishes 
of his or her client and increases the likelihood that that client's constitutional right 
to an impartial jury will be violated. 
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 In determining whether Joseph's actions constituted a sound trial strategy, the 
majority places great emphasis upon the fact that his decision stemmed from a belief that 
the "jury was the best that could be expected from Weatherwax's point of view." (Maj. Op. 
at 16).  In light of this, the majority concludes, "the [strategic] decision not to inform 
the court was reasonable `under prevailing professional norms.'"0  (Maj. Op. at 16).  In 
other words, Joseph thought that "he had the best jury possible under the circumstances 
and he made a judgment that many competent litigators would make under the same 
circumstances." (Maj. Op. at 16).  Respectfully, I believe my colleagues' focus is both 
legally and logically misplaced. 
 Arguably, most if not all decisions by counsel before, during and after a trial 
can be considered strategic.  As a result, a finding that a particular decision was 
strategic, in and of itself, cannot answer the question whether that decision falls withi
the "wide range of . . . competent assistance."  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984).  Put differently, not all strategic decisions are by definition 
professionally reasonable.0  In order to determine whether a particular strategic dec
                     
0
 According to the majority, "[b]ringing the newspaper incident to the court's 
attention would have created a likelihood that the court would either declare a mistrial 
or excuse a juror whom Joseph felt favored the defense."  (Maj. Op. at 16).  A mistrial or 
the dismissal of a juror, however, would necessarily have required a finding that:  (1) 
the newspaper article was read by one or more jurors; (2) that its contents were 
prejudicial to Weatherwax; and (3) that a juror who read the article was actually 
influenced by its prejudicial nature. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax
20 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 
F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987)).  If the court were to have found that a particular juror 
presumably the white member of the jury seen carrying the newspaper -- should be dismissed 
(i.e., that he was actually prejudiced by reading the article), then it is totally 
illogical to argue that Weatherwax would still have benefitted from the presence of that 
juror simply because the juror was white. 
0
 In Government of Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 20 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 1994), our 
first review of this case, we observed that "trial counsel's actions here would indicat
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constituted "competent assistance," we must assess the underlying basis for that decision 
-- an inquiry that, in my view, is not sufficiently pursued by the majority.  Moreover, 
because the majority does not fully confront why Joseph felt that this was the best 
possible jury from Weatherwax's perspective, its conclusion that Joseph's inaction was 
"reasonable `under prevailing professional norms'" strikes me as quite a leap, to say the 
least. 
 The following hypothetical, I think, will help to illustrate my point. 
 Suppose that John Doe, a black man, is charged with first degree murder for 
shooting a white man, but claims that the killing was in self-defense.  Furthermore, 
suppose that Doe's jury is all white.  During the course of the trial Doe's attorney 
decides not to call to the stand a black man, who was a witness to the crime, despite 
Doe's request that the testimony be heard. 
 On appeal, Doe brings an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in which he 
alleges that his lawyer was incompetent based upon his decision not to introduce the 
eyewitness testimony of the black man, whom Doe felt potentially could have aided in his 
defense.  In response to this charge, Doe's lawyer claims that he chose not to call this 
individual as a witness because he made a professional judgment and concluded that the 
witness's testimony would have had no impact upon the jury. 
                                                                                          
that representation was deficient unless the district court determines he [Joseph] decided 
to forego voir dire because he thought the jury was favorable to his client."  I was a 
member of the panel which decided that case, and I adhere to this statement insofar as it 
is premised upon the notion that strategic decisions by counsel, including those based 
upon a lawyer's belief that a jury is favorable to his client, are presumptively 
reasonable.  In this case, however, the record developed on remand clearly demonstrates 
that Joseph's reliance upon the favorable make-up of the jury as an explanation for his 
inaction was unreasonable because it was motivated solely by an illegitimate race-based 
stereotype. 
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 Under the majority's logic, the lawyer's explanation that the witness was not 
called because the testimony would have been ineffectual would, standing alone, constitute 
a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that Doe's counsel acted "reasonably `under 
prevailing professional norms.'"  (See Maj. Op. at 18 (favorably citing United States v. 
Long, 674 F.2d 848, 855 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that counsel's failure to call alibi 
witness was not ineffective assistance and stating:  "This Court will not-second guess 
tactical decisions of counsel in deciding whether to call certain witnesses."))).  In 
other words, the majority would not find it necessary to question why Doe's counsel felt 
that the eyewitness's testimony was not worth introducing. 
 Suppose, however, that the answer to the question the majority does not ask was 
that Doe's attorney made his decision not because he believed that the witness or his 
story would be incredible, but because he felt strongly that the testimony of a black 
person would simply carry no weight in the minds of an all-white jury because the victim 
was white.  Surely, the majority would not conclude that Doe's counsel employed a 
reasonable strategy by allowing this type of outmoded racial stereotyping to influence a 
decision whether or not to call the witness.  To countenance such an approach, under the 
guise of "strategic decisionmaking," would be to place a judicial imprimatur upon the type 
of evil that Batson and its progeny sought to bury.  I have no doubt that under such 
circumstances, we would not permit either a criminal defendant or our system of justice to 
risk being sacrificed to an odious form of racial reasoning disguised as a legitimate 
strategic judgment. 
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 And yet, a close examination of the record in this case reveals that the logic 
underlying why Joseph decided not to bring the newspaper incident to the court's attention 
is very similar to that of Doe's attorney. 
 For example, in arguing to the district court that Joseph's decision was 
reasonable and did not require a new trial, the attorney for the government stated that:
 As unlikable as it may be, we all have prejudices and prejudices 
may play at trials and Attorney Joseph, based upon his education and 
training but more his experience, told you that, typically speaking, I 
don't like Continentals on my juries . . .  
 
 In this case I can say I guess fairly that Michael Joseph cut 
against the grain. He didn't do the same old thing this time. He was 
insightful.  He said I have a different defendant with a different 
profile. . . .  Three Continentals on this jury?  I don't want to 
disturb this jury.  I want to leave it the way it is.  It was a 
tactical decision.  He tried to get that jury.  He accomplished the 
fact of getting that jury and once it was empaneled, he didn't want to 
disturb it. 
 
 . . .  
 
 He said . . . I wanted to keep this jury because I knew with 
three Continentals on there that he had a better chance. 
(JA 84).  Moreover, the "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," submitted by 
the government to the trial court, stated: 
Because the petitioner is Caucasian, and because he had been charged 
with killing a black man, Joseph decided that it was important to 
empanel as many Caucasians people on the jury as possible because he 
believed that Caucasians would identify with the petitioner.  Given 
the nature of the charge, first degree murder, the Court finds that 
Joseph's strategy, in that regard, was eminently reasonable. 
(JA 98) (emphasis added). 
 Simply put, Joseph disregarded his client's request that he "do something" about 
the newspaper incident because he felt that the three white jurors, solely because they 
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were white, would sympathize with Weatherwax.  In fact, Joseph's judgment was entirely 
motivated by race.  For example, he stated that "Continentals [i.e. white people] are 
often retirees who are viewed as conservative and anti-crime."  (See Appellant's Br. at 8 
n.4.)  This admission reveals that there was no reason whatsoever for Joseph to conclude 
that the three white jurors would identify with Weatherwax other than their shared race.  
Why else would persons who are "conservative and anti-crime" identify with an individual 
charged with first degree murder and illegal possession of a firearm? 
 Joseph's troubling assumptions about the racial partisanship of the white jurors 
were so deep-seated that he was willing to risk allowing a white juror, who could have 
been prejudiced by an unfavorable article written about his client's testimony, to remain 
on the jury.0  In Joseph's testimony before the district court, he went so far as to say 
"even if I was [sic] told that the jury was reading the paper, it would not have made much 
difference to me."  See Judge Brotman's Memorandum Opinion at 4.  In my opinion, to the 
extent such unfortunate assumptions might ever be considered reasonable, they simply 
cannot form the basis of a professionally reasonable strategic decision in light of the 
interests that weighed in favor of bringing the matter to the court's attention. 
 On one side of the scale was Joseph's assumption that the white jurors would 
sympathize with Weatherwax based only on their shared race, an approach which, 
predictably, backfired and which the Supreme Court explicitly rejected as unreasonable in 
Batson.  On the merits, this assumption is undeserving of any weight, but if one were to 
pretend that it should carry any, one might conclude that it weighed in favor of not 
                     
0
 During the hearing before the district court, Mrs. Lay testified that Joseph "said 
that the jury [sic] with the newspaper is a white man."  (J.A. at 68). 
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informing the court about the newspaper incident.0  But on the other side of the scale 
were two legitimate and important considerations: (1) Weatherwax's explicit request that 
Joseph "do something" about the newspaper incident; and (2) the potential that a failure 
to do so could jeopardize Weatherwax's constitutional right to an impartial jury.  When 
balanced against one another the only professionally responsible and reasonable choice for 
Joseph was to inform the trial court of what had occurred.0 
                     
0
 As stated earlier, the unreasonableness of Joseph's assumption is demonstrated by the 
fact that he was willing to risk allowing white jurors, who may have been prejudiced 
against his client by reading an unfavorable article about his client's testimony, to 
remain on the jury simply based upon their race. In my opinion, such a judgment is 
professionally indefensible. 
 
 In the majority's view, however, the underlying basis for Joseph's decision finds 
support in a variety of social science research, which tends to show that jurors are in 
fact partial to defendants of the same race.  I do not dispute the legitimacy or accuracy 
of these studies or theories.  Rather, I simply believe that it is unreasonable to assume 
that these "affinities" are so deep-seated that they would justify the risk of allowing a 
potentially biased or prejudiced juror to remain on the jury solely due to his or her 
race.  For example, if Joseph had discovered that one of the white jurors was married to a 
relative of the crime victim, I am confident that the majority would not consider it 
reasonable for Joseph to want to keep that white juror on the case simply because of his 
or her race.  Thus, it seems clear to me that concerns over juror prejudice --particularly 
when raised by a client -- must trump assumptions about the racial partisanship of jurors.
0
 Even if I could conceive of a convincing argument that Joseph's decision constituted 
a reasonable strategy, which I cannot, I would still conclude that his actions fell below 
professional norms.  Rather than completely ignore his client's wishes, the more 
appropriate action for Joseph would have been to bring the matter to the attention of 
court, and then to ask the court not to poll the jury because of its "favorable" make
 
 The majority contends that "had Joseph brought the newspaper incident to the trial 
court's attention, the court would have had an affirmative obligation to conduct voir dire
. . . ."  See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 
1987) ("In every case where the trial court learns that a member or members of the jury 
may have received extra-record information with a potential for substantial prejudice, the 
trial court must determine whether the members of the jury have been prejudiced.") 
(emphasis added) (Maj. Op. at 16-17 n.3).  I disagree.  As the majority itself notes, 
"[t]he [newspaper] article . . . included no extra-record information about Weatherwax or 
the crime."  (Maj. Op. at 3 n.1) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, I believe that by 
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 Because Joseph's decision was motivated by improper, illegitimate, indefensible, 
outmoded stereotypical assumptions about the proclivities of whites and blacks when they 
are called upon to sit in judgment of their fellow citizens, and because his decision fell 
far outside "the wide range of professionally competent assistance," to which Weatherwax 
was entitled, I would affirm the district court's order.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
                                                                                          
bringing the matter to the court's attention, Joseph would have accommodated the request 
of his client, while simultaneously protecting his trial strategy.  Moreover, although 
less desirable, once Weatherwax was found guilty of second-degree murder, this course of 
action would have enabled Joseph to file a motion for a new trial based on the newspaper 
incident.  See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 33. 
